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INTERNAL?EXTERNAL: DOXASTIC NORMS AND THE DEFUSING OF SKEPTICAL PARADOX
This brief discussion touches on several interrelated major is sues, each of which would require a much more extended treatment if one wanted to command a settled view. My aim, accordingly, is no more than to make a number of points plausible whose importance, if correct, is considerable. They are primarily the following four. First, we should recognize a plurality of norms of belief, broadly divided in particular between those that pertain to the teleology of believing, and those that have to do constitutively with management of a system of belief. Second, we should expect the opposition between so-called internalist and externalist conceptions of knowledge and justification to be extensible in principle to all doxastic norms, and should be receptive to the possibility that exter nalist conceptions may promise best for some norms, and internalist conceptions for others. Third, and correspondingly, it is to be ex pected that the paradoxes of skepticism, classically centered on knowl edge and justified belief, will be adaptable to doxastic norms in general. (Here it is crucial to separate those "first-order" paradoxes that argue that compliance with a given norm is impossible and those "second-order" paradoxes that argue, for example, that, even if com pliance is possible, we are actually in no position to claim that we ever succeed in so complying.) This potential generality in the scope of the paradoxes counsels caution about the widely accepted notion?which will be a central focus in the latter part of the paper?that externalism offers resources to defuse the threat of skepticism. Finally, I will argue that thinking through how externalism is supposed to help with even the simplest form of (Cartesian) knowledge-skeptical paradox dis closes a commitment to a doxastic norm of warrant that cannot itself be construed externalistically, if fit for purpose, but is vulnerable to the very same form of paradox. i There are more and less ambitious ways to try to understand the no tion of a norm of belief. Here we can begin with something relatively minimal. A norm of belief, O, is, minimally, any canon meeting the following two conditions:
(i) O's satisfaction, or nonsatisfaction, by a belief opens it to justified commendation/censure respectively; 502 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Norms of belief, so characterized, are constraints on belief-formation and retention that one can effectively aim to respect and which, by the extent to which they are respected, make for better (systems of) beliefs than otherwise. 'Effectively' here does not require that one can guarantee success, but incorporates the ordinary idea of an ability to succeed which one can normally exercise. This bland characterization covers a wide class of things one might view as uncontroversial doxastic norms, including each of truth, knowl edge, justification, coherence, and the multi-faceted notion of rationality.
Each of these, so we ordinarily think, are things the attainment of which, or compliance with which, is usually feasible by a well inten tioned, normally competent human subject, and each is such that its attainment makes for a better overall doxastic accomplishment than otherwise. The blandness comes at a cost, however, in the evident point that the offered characterization allows an indefinite range of charac teristics to qualify as doxastic norms which one does not think of as distinctively doxastic: for instance, survival-conduciveness, happiness conduciveness, eternal bliss-conduciveness (Pascal)?all of these are characteristics whose possession opens a belief to commendation along some dimension of importance to us, and at which?with the possible ex ception of the last?we would normally think that we can effectively aim.
ii What is wanted is some further consideration to narrow the relevant class of normative characteristics to those that are in some way properly doxastic?that are somehow peculiar to the business of belief forma tion and management. An obvious proposal, in keeping with the minimalist approach, would simply be to exclude from consideration any characteristic <J> of beliefs which meets the two conditions noted but which can also meet those conditions with respect to types of ac tion, or state, which are not beliefs, indeed are not even attitudinal, and yet still retain the intuitive normativity captured by conditions (i) and (ii) when so applied. Survival-conduciveness, for example, is a laudable feature in beliefs and may often be a feasible aim in the con text of belief-management; but it is also a good thing in actions in general?fitting an airbag in a car, for example. By contrast, there is no clear sense in which the act of airbag installation can be said to amount to an item of knowledge, or to be true, or coherent; (though there are senses in which it can be justified, or rational). So we might add the following to the two clauses above:
(iii) <P is a characteristic that can be satisfied only by belief.
Yet plainly, that is little progress as it stands. Perhaps only beliefs can amount to knowledge. But propositions, statements, and lovers can be true; courses of action can be justified; desires can be coherent decisions can be rational. The normative predicates in questio applicable to a wide class of things other than belief. It might be tered that, while that is so, they take on distinctive senses when app to beliefs; and that in those senses, they apply only to beliefs. Ev that were true, however?I do not say it is not?the obvious r would be that in that case, what we need to understand are wh nerically, the specifically belief-appropriate characteristics expr by the listed predicates have in common: what it is that makes t features proper to belief, and forces a different reference on the pr cates concerned when applied to things other than belief. Either we need a more illuminating account. hi The matter is complex, but there is a very natural general su It is that beliefs are distinguished among attitudinal states by their possession of a telosr. believing is something one d view to capturing the truth?the fundamental aim of belief trasted with supposition or mere entertaining, is to believe so, then one class of properly doxastic norms will be those c with which ensures or tends to promote the achievement of damental aim, and/or noncompliance with which tends to fr Each of the five characteristics listed above?truth, kn ability, justification, coherence, and rationality?can be arg a proper doxastic norm in the light of this simple proposal. is trivial for truth, of course, and for knowledgeability beca factivity. It is less immediate for the other cases. For coherence be suggested that incoherent belief systems, in so far as that is implicating inconsistency, must contain some falsehoods; so aiming at the truth, one should avoid incoherence. The arg even less direct?indeed, less convincing?for justification an tionality, but one can make a stab. Beliefs held without evidenc no reason, will be held for causes unconnected with the fact concerned with; so their truth, if they are true, will be liable t matter of luck. Since if one is aiming at the truth, one shou fashion one's beliefs in ways that do not leave success in tha to mere chance, one should aim wherever possible to have ju and/or reasons for the things one believes. are not merely characteristics whose satisfaction/nonsatisfaction opens a belief to commendation or criticism, but characteristics whose satisfaction/nonsatisfaction opens a belief to commendation or criti cism in relation to the fundamental objectives of a system of belief.1 IV Arguably, however, an account of the properly doxastic norms incorpo rating just (i)* and (ii) undergenerates in a way that calls the adequacy of the truth-centered proposal into question. Consider an inquirer en gaged in developing and organizing a system of belief just with the aim of maximizing truth and minimizing error (?so we set aside consid erations of interest, relevance, and importance). Then clearly one class of norms which he should aim to respect are essentially those so far considered: those respecting which is sufficient, or necessary, or both, for the achievement of those aims. But in prioritizing the truth-centered norms?or better, the truth-centered way of thinking about them?one's focus already completely bypasses the role (or at least the possibility) of a range of norms whose province is not directly concerned with success or failure but which are prior to that?are es sentially involved in running anything properly regarded as a system of belief at all. There is a parallel here with norms of agency. It is a norm of action that one should do what is in best accord with one's desires and interests, in the light of one's beliefs. Action that falls short of this standard is variously irrational or akratic. But it is also, necessarily, ex ceptional. The norm in question is not a norm of action merely in the sense that actions that violate it fail to accomplish the agent's ends and are open to criticism accordingly. Rather, it is a constitutive norm, com pliance with which is necessary, in the round, if a performer is to count as a rational agent?as acting?at all.
In general, one should expect intentional practices to be subject to at least two fundamentally different categories of norm: teleologica norms, identifying or connected with the achievement of the (funda mental) aims of the practice; and constitutive norms, which need to be observed (enough) by any practitioner who is to count as successfully engaging in the practice in the first place. So it is only to be expected 1 Although the point has no application to single beliefs, there is of course a distinc tion, implicit in the lines of thought just sketched, between aiming at the truth and aiming to minimize error when it comes to the management of simultaneous beliefs. A worked out development of the truth-centered proposal would need to explore the resulting possible competition of priorities. that belief-management itself, like action in general, will be subject not only to teleological norms, concerned with achieving truth and avoiding falsehood, but also to its own special constitutive norms? principles with which compliance is not merely necessary, or suffi cient, in order to ensure that a system of belief achieves its character istic purposes, but mandatory, in the round, if what is going on is to count as believing?as the very management of a system of belief.
Their distinction does not involve, of course, that one should ex pect the norms falling under these respective headings to divide into two discrete lists. There is no reason why the telos of a practice should not be constitutive of it. Plausibly, this is not in general so: arguably, one can play Chess, that is observe every norm constitutive of the ac tivity of playing chess, without trying to checkmate one's opponent's King (one may play to encourage a learner, and for all that, one is playing Chess). But it is also plausible that one does not count as be lieving unless one in general exhibits a propensity to regulate one's be liefs by considerations that pertain to their achievement of the truth.
It is to be expected that at least some of the norms of belief on our list will turn out to wear two faces, serving both as truth-conducive and belief-constitutive norms.
The immediate effect of this consideration, I suggest, is a pointer to a much more satisfying account of the status of the norms of coher ence, justification, and rationality than the type of thought adverted to above. No doubt these norms are all truth-connected. But their more fundamental role is constitutive. It is, for example, not just that disciplining one's beliefs by evidence promotes?so we hope?their propensity to truth; it is that only a system of evidentially disciplined beliefs counts as a system of belief. And it is not just that disciplining one's belief by mutual coherence helps promote their avoidance of falsehood; it is that only a thinker who is concerned to strive for and maintain the coherence of his set of beliefs qualifies as engaged in belief. Beliefs are normatively individuated, distinguished by the conditions under which they ought to be held and the impacts they ought to have on one's other beliefs; and it is only to the extent that one aims to respect these normative constraints that one can manifest what it is that one believes and so present oneself as believing anything.
All this needs a more refined discussion. The thesis I hope to have made plausible is that one should expect that properly doxastic norms comprise at least two fundamentally different but nonexclusive kinds: those connected with the telos of attainment of the truth and the avoidance of error; and those a broad respect of which is constitutive of the management of a very system of belief. Although any given norm may wear both hats, we should be alert to the possibility that some may not. And, although I have no space to explore the ramifica tions here, the distinction in turn has potential repercussions for the opposition between internalist and externalist construals of doxastic norms which provides our primary concern.
One potential corollary. I implicitly adverted above to Pascal's Wager. A distinction is often emphasized between properly epistemic norms of belief and merely "pragmatic" normative characteristics that a belief may have?like somehow serving the advantage of the believer. Then it is suggested that justification conferred by the possession of evidence is an epistemic norm par excellence', whereas justification (if any) conferred by the reasoning of Pascal's wager is a merely pragmatic matter.2 The distinction needs no more than the resources of the truth-centered view and the two clauses, (1)* and (ii), above. But if what I have suggested is correct, it is not a distinction to get fixated by. One might extend the terminology of epistemic justification to include good standing in the light of any teleological or constitutive doxastic norm. But in any case, if one wishes to reserve it for the more narrowly evidential, what is left over includes much more than the merely "pragmatic."3 v How best to characterize the opposing positions debates between so-called internalist and external knowledge, and of justification, is a matter of cont cupy us in a moment. But it is clear, even from th preceding, that those two debates are merely exam much more extensive species: we should be ready more norms of belief, both teleological and con knowledgeability and evidence; and with the resp norms, ceteris paribus, we should expect there to ple, for an opposition between broadly internalist nalist accounts. An immediate potential bearing of the debates about skepticism. There is a widespread sense?though by no means universal?that skepticism, at least of the kinds that come down to us from Descartes and Hume, presupposes a broadly inter nalist oudook with respect to knowledge, or justified belief, and so might be effectively neutralized if suitable externalist conceptions can be sus tained of these norms. Our discussion to this point already sounds a cautionary note about this. Even if it is true that knowledge, and/or justification, are best externally construed, and that traditional forms of skepticism about those notions presuppose otherwise, it is only to be expected that at least some of the available forms of skeptical paradox will assail other norms as well, some of which may be no less important, but also open to no plausible form of externalist construal. The discus sion to follow makes some initial forays into the landscape suggested by these remarks.
Knowledge is a kind of true belief. But hardly anyone thinks that all true belief is knowledge.4 Internalist conceptions of knowledge regard it, broadly, as true belief with certain additional, "internally" certifiable features. That one has an "account," in the sense of the Theaetetus, is presumably an internally certifiable matter in the relevant sense, and "true belief with an account" is thus the archetypical internalist pro posal. Note that the good standing of the debate between internalist and externalist conceptions does not presuppose the analysability of knowledge. One can hold that there are necessary or sufficient condi tions for knowledge without knowing that there are any nontrivial necessary and sufficient ones. I shall take a condition to be internally certifiable in the germane sense if its satisfaction consists in circum stances which may be ascertained using just resources of a priori reflec tion, deductive inference, and ordinary psychological self-knowledge? the ordinary knowledge that each of us has, at least according to commonsense intentional psychology, of our own beliefs, desires, ex periences, appearances, and passions. So internalist conceptions of knowledge, broadly understood, have it that it is a kind of true belief disciplined by norms whose satisfaction?other than, in general, the norm of truth itself, of course?may be verified using the resources just noted. Externalist conceptions, by contrast, waive the restriction, allowing that the additional knowledge-making (or unmaking) charac teristics may be such that their satisfaction demands additional episte mic capabilities, or even perhaps may not be verifiable at all.
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Evidently this form of distinction straightforwardly generalizes to norms in general. We can propose, for an arbitrary norm O over any given activity, that:
O is internal iff its satisfaction consists in circumstances whose obtaining can be verified by a priori reflection, reasoning, and routine self-knowledge;
and is external otherwise.5
However, that proposal contrasts with a more relaxed conception, which may be formulated as follows:
<D is internal if, whatever the nature of the circumstances in which its satisfaction consists, one may effectively control the pursuit of it by means which rely only on a priori reflection, reasoning, and routine self-knowledge.
While I do not suggest that the second formulation corresponds ex actly to anything anyone has ever understood by the broad heading of "internalism," the distinction between the two formulations focuses on an important point. A common motivation for internalism about epistemic norms in roughly the sense gestured at by the first formula tion is the thought that the pursuit of the satisfaction of such norms? and indeed, perhaps, rule-following in general?must in the end be something that we can police on the internal stage, as it were: that if I am to follow a rule that mandates, say, a certain course of action when certain conditions obtain, all I can?"in the end"?do is to make sure I respond appropriately when it seems to me that those conditions obtain.
There may, or may not, be an important insight gestured at by this train of thought.6 My present point is that even if there is, all it man dates is a conception of epistemic norms as internal in the second of the two senses noted. It may be that, in setting oneself to comply with the norm of carrying an umbrella only if the sky is cloudy, one cannot do better in the end than to suit one's behavior to one's subjective impres sion of the state of the sky; but it hardly follows that the presence of a cloudy sky is something that can be verified by a priori reflection, rea soning, and routine self-knowledge. If there is a good motivation to regard some epistemic norms internalistically in something like the sense gestured at by the first formulation, it is not provided by the gen eral thought that, in order to be able to follow any rule, the difference 5 Just to emphasize again: knowledge is not, of course, on anyone's account, a purely internal norm in this sense. Epistemic internalism has to do with the nature of the nor mative characteristics that distinguish knowledgeable beliefs from merely true ones.
6 For a subtle discussion of the issues, see Ralph Wedgwood, "Internalism Explained," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, lxv (2002): 349-69. between circumstances in which it is satisfied and circumstances in which it is not has to be capable of some kind of impact on phenom enal consciousness. vi Are traditional forms of skepticism about knowledge and just dependent on internalist construal of those notions? And can be effectively finessed by falling back on externalist surrog less tendentiously, by the reflection that those notions were, all properly understood externalistically?
To fix ideas, consider perhaps the simplest form of kno skeptical paradox, exploiting just the closure of knowledg (known) entailment, and the apparent possibility of certain tively normal-seeming but perceptually utterly dysfunctional sce whose obtaining would be inconsistent with the truth of most we take to be our present body of empirical knowledge. The in question could be that of systematic deception concer things material by a Cartesian Evil Demon, or the twentieth fantasy of envatment of one's disembodied brain by an evil s Let SHbe any such scenario and Pbe any proposition which o dardly takes oneself to know by means reliant on percept whose truth is inconsistent with SH (Pmight be, for example, position that one has two hands.) The resulting skeptical could hardly be simpler. It proceeds by reflecting that it is no that SH does not obtain, but that it is known that if Pis true, not obtain; hence it is not known that P Since Pis parametric proposition whose truth is incompatible with SH?a range wh compasses almost everything we ordinarily regard as our rou ceptual knowledge?we should conclude that we in fact have h any of that knowledge.
More formally, let Wexpress one's possession of any f warrant for belief which is closed under (recognized) logic quence; and let Pbe any proposition which is perceptually wa if warranted at all. Then the structure of the paradox is:
.'. ~WP (from 1 and 2, by closure of 'W and routine logic)
Where is the (alleged) presupposition of internalism in this is surely no fault to be found with premise (2) in any case, w one's view of knowledge or other relevant notions of warrant ternalist views of knowledge that emphasize what has com known as sensitivity?the condition, endorsed by Fred Dretsk Robert Nozick,7 that a belief is knowledgeable only if, were it not true, it would not be held?the prospects also look bleak for faulting premise (1). For were SH to be true, one would still believe that it was not. But familiarly these famous views provide another recourse: that of rejecting closure, since it may happen that for suitable P and Q, P entails Q and is truly believed with sensitivity, although the (ac tually) true belief that Q would persist in circumstances where Q was false. I have nothing to add here to the prevailing opinion that it leans towards a reductio of sensitivity-prioritizing views that they bring closure into question in this kind of way.
If there is a presupposition of internalism then, it had better be with premise (1). In fact, the situation is complex. The driving thought behind premise (1) is simply that SH has been so selected as to ensure that the case where it obtains is subjectively indistinguishable from the case where it does not?it is all the same on the inside, as it were.
In order for that to yield premise (1), we need to take it that whatever notion of warrant we have assigned to ' W, it at least supervenes on subjective state?so that one has warrant for any given proposition in both, if in either, of any pair of subjectively, indistinguishable situa tions. Internalism will underwrite that much. But the supervenience by itself does not enforce premise (1); it merely entails that, with re spect to the question of warrant for the supposition that SH does not obtain, one must describe the two subjectively indistinguishable situa tions, where it respectively does and does not obtain, in the same way? that description could be to the effect that there is warrant to discount SH, for all that has so far been said.
VII
There are various possible lines of thought to motivate premise (1), but I shall not pursue the matter here.8 If internalism actually en forced the premise, that would be extremely striking. But the mos that is realistically to be expected is a case of some less conclusive kind.
Our interest is accordingly in whether externalism can pre-empt an such case?whether it undercuts any motive for premise (1). In essence we need externalist argument for (*) ~W [~W~SH] ?the contention that premise (1) is unwarranted. What can be offered With sensitivity set aside, there are two standard externalist propos als about knowledge and justification. One is reliability: a belief counts as knowledgeable, or justified, only if it is the product of the exercise of a reliable method of belief-formation. In order for this to amount to a definite proposal, something needs to be said, of course, about how reliable, reliable in which circumstances, and on what range of matters, and so on. But the considerations to follow will not depend on our addressing the most felicitous formulation of reliabilism. The second standard externalist proposal is safety: where, roughly, a belief is safe just in case it is not merely actually true but true in all "nearby worlds"?would still be true, that is, if things were different in any not too-outlandish way, any way they might "easily have been" different. Again, we need not trouble over the detail of the best formulation. Either of these proposals promises fairly straightforward prima facie support for (*).
First Now let WP = Pis reliably (truly) believed. And let Pbe any proposi tion concerning the external material environment, which we would ordinarily take to be part of our perceptual knowledge and which is inconsistent with SH Presumably it is at least not to be ruled out that Pis, as a matter of fact, reliably (truly) believed. Suppose that is actually so. If ~SH is then believed on the basis of its entailment by P9 this too will be a reliable true belief. Hence, again, it is not ruled out that W~SH. If it is not ruled out that P may be taken to entail ~ W~P, then we have that
~W~[W~SH]
which, after rebracketing, is?again?exactly what was sought. VIII Making a case for (*) is, however, insufficient to defuse the skeptical threat?at least once it is remembered that it is hardly less uncomfortable to be saddled with the conclusion that our claims to warrant are un warranted than with the conclusion that they are actually false. The problem is that (*)?that there is no warrant for the original premise (1)?is quite consistent with (1)+ ; namely, that there is no warrant to deny original premise (1). Now as the reader will speedily appreciate, '~ obeys closure if ' W does. And this is still a paradoxical result. If ' W expresses knowledge, for example, it in effect says?given the constraints on 'P'?that we have no knowledge that we have any perceptual knowledge. It is all the same, as far as any cognitive achievement of ours is concerned, whether our perceptual faculties have afforded us any knowledge or not. If exter nalism were content to acknowledge the correctness of this second order genre of skepticism, it would be a somewhat Pyrrhic victory to have blocked off its first-order counterpart. Externalism needs to be able not merely to reject premise (1)?that is, argue cogentiy for (*)?but also to reject (1)+ ~W~ [~W~SH] For otherwise, the "second-order" paradox remains unaddressed.
Yet intuitively, it may seem that (1)+ should actually be acceptable to the externalist. His basic thought about (*) was that it holds because, for all we?or "the Skeptic"?can show to the contrary, it may be that we can reliably, or safely?hence warrantedly?believe ~SH. What set tles whether W~SH is, precisely, external to us and our thoughts and reflections. But if so, then surely he has also to grant that this external settlement may go against W~SH? The externalist should grant that it may be that ~W~SH: that, as things happen to stand, there is no safely, or reliably believing that SHis false. That is a possibility we can not warrantedly discount?and that is enough, seemingly, for premise (1)+. So what progress? The safety-or reliability-based strategy for finding fault with original premise (1) seems to play straight into the hands of second-order skepticism. IX I think this point is basically correct. But, at least for those with developed externalist sympathies, it may provoke a suspicion of eq cation. How exactly are we meant to understand the outer occurr of' ~ W~' in (1)+ if that premise is to be compelling? Suppose that i is to be externalistically understood. Well then, if an external?sa or reliability-dependent?construal of' W in Premise (1) ~W~[S//] successfully undermines the skeptical case for it, (whatever in de that case may be) by justifying (1)* in the ways we reviewed, why wo a similar construal undermine any case for (1)+ in turn? Indeed, w ever any skeptical paradox works with our alleged inability warranted to discount some epistemologically mischief-making supposition, A, w will there not always be an externalist riposte to the effect that, matters external to us will determine whether or not W~[A], the tic is in no position to affirm ~W~[A]?
What I think has not been generally grasped with any clarity is that t whole strategy of externalist counter to skepticism is unstable. Reconsid (*) ~W [~W~SH] ?the denial that there is warrant for the first premise of the original simple paradox. Above we rehearsed impressive-seeming cases based on reliability and safety respectively for the acceptance of (*). But re flect that in order to be in position to affirm (*) on those grounds, we must take ourselves to be in position to affirm (**) ~W [SH] For if SHholds, then can be neither reliably nor safely?nor, ergo, warrantedly?believed. But when the occurrence of'W in (**) is ex ternally construed in its turn, it requires that SH itself can be neither safely nor reliably believed. And the externalist has no better assurance of that than "the Skeptic" had that ~ SH could be neither safely nor reliably believed, at the point when motivation was to be provided for premise (1) of the original paradox.
Here are the essential moves in the dialectic. Skepticism proposes (1) ~w~S/7 on the basis of the possible subjective indistinguishability of scenarios where SH obtains and what we like to think of as Normality. The Ex ternalist counters that, for his preferred reading of' W\ (1) is unwar ranted, which is to affirm (*) ~W[~W~S/7], on the ground that the point about subjective indistinguishability is in no tension with the truth of W~SH so long as ' W is appropriately ex ternally construed. We then observed that a commitment to (*) is a commitment to (**) ~W[SH], when ' W is appropriately externally construed, since SH then entails ~W~SH; but that in fact the original externalist reasons for refusing (1) seem to go over just as well into reasons for refusing (**), the com mitment to (*) notwithstanding. In the present setting, it ought to de pend on the external circumstances whether or not SH may be believed with warrant. The externalist is committed to regarding (**), externally construed, as just as inappropriate, and for the very same reasons, as the skeptical premise that we cannot warrantedly suppose that SH does not obtain. On the contrary, we may, she should allow, warrantedly suppose that SH does obtain?if, for example, the belief that it does is, alas, safe: is true in all relevantly nearby worlds.9 At this point it appears, then, that externalism actually provides no coherent motive for (*), so no coherent motive for repudiating the original skeptical premise (1). The appearance to the contrary was just an illusion, induced by failing to pursue the implications of a thor oughgoing externalist construal of the relevant epistemic operator sufficiently far.
x Yet this does not seem right. Surely the ext motive for something like (*). The thought s indeed compelling, that the standard kind o no ground to discount the scenario where m brain in a vat, say, is a safe belief, or a reliably that case, if safety, or reliability, suffices for w exactly that W~SHmzy be true. What gives ri ited is the construal of this "left openness" where the very same sense of6 W?the same volved. It is when that is in turn construed a reliability?lines that the externalist point p ple moral suggests itself: in order to express fectly good objection to the simple skeptica needs recourse to a notion of warrant for a b is not itself to be externally construed. 9 To be sure, that is not a belief we actually?most of the possibility of warrantedly holding it. I think the moral is correct. But it is certainly not immediate. It is clear that the externalist cannot avoid the aporia so long as he tries to give expression to the lack of warrant he claims there is for the skep tical premise in terms of the same notion of warrant that, he wants to maintain, we may yet have for discounting the skeptical scenario. So the outer 4W in (*) has to express a different notion of warrant to the inner one. But why does it have to differ by being internalist?
This gap can be closed. Suppose it were different but still external. Then the distinction between situations where we had this kind of ex ternal warrant for a belief and cases where we did not would not supervene on differences available to a priori reasoning, reflection, and ordinary self-knowledge. Yet, if the externalist is to press his origi nal objection to the simple skeptical argument, he needs to be in posi tion to affirm the version of (*) that results when the inner and outer references to warrant are interpreted appropriately differently:
(*)' ~W [~W~S/7] And if 'W still expresses some kind of externalist warrant, the obvious question is going to concern how the externalist is in any better position to justify (*)' than he was with respect to (*). If the distinction between cases where (*)' is true and cases where it is not turns on features that are not available to a priori reasoning, reflection, and ordinary self knowledge, what is the externalist case for (*)and why is it not as pre sumptuous as the abortive case for original (*)?
We should conclude that the proper formulation of and case for the basic externalist objection to the kind of traditional skeptical rou tine of which the paradox we have focused on provides the simplest example, demands recourse to an internalist notion of warrant. The basic externalist point boils down to this: that it cannot be certified by internalist means that we do not, for example, know that we are not brains in vats?not if knowledge is appropriately externally construed. Accordingly, a thoroughgoing epistemic externalism?one which con strues all belief-mandating norms externally?is incapable of deliver ing one of the supposed principal advantages of externalism: the safeguarding of the idea that we may be just as knowledgeable as we ordinarily take ourselves to be. Rather, in order to safeguard this idea, a pluralistic view is needed: one that runs internal and external belief-mandating norms simultaneously. XI These reflections do not yet, of course, constitute a demonstrat either of the good standing or the importance of any internalis tion of warrant. Rather they unpack certain of the commitments of externalist who wants to respond to the skeptical paradox?and so to that extent takes skepticism seriously?in the way we have been scout ing. That response, we have seen, is a commitment to the good stand ing of an internalist notion. But what about its importance? Might it be open to the externalist to take the view that while there is indeed scope for perfectly coherent internalist notions of warrant, it is exter nalist warrant that is of primary significance for the management of belief and practical deliberation?that little of value depends on the possession, or lack thereof, of internalist warrant for belief?
It is not. Consider: what does externalism want to follow from the truth of (*)'?from the lack of Warrant, so to put it, for the skeptical premise? If this reflection is to disarm the paradox, it has to be something which lets us pay it no further attention in good intellectual conscience?
something which disarms its key premise's claims to credibility. We are, the implication has to be, in no position to claim?to assert or believe?
that premise (1) is true. For if this is not implied, nothing has been said to disarm the (putative) plausibility of the premise. The commitment of the externalist way with the simple paradox is thus to a notion of warrant which is internal and which determines which statements we should consider ourselves in position to claim to be true. If, as many contemporary theorists suppose, it is knowledge of a statement that constitutes its assertibility, then to have Warrant for a statement is thus to be in position to claim that one knows it (and if something else confers assertibility, it is to be in position to claim that one has that.) XII It is perhaps superfluous to highlight the sting in the tail. We have see that to the extent that we take the basic externalist response to paradox to be coherent and well motivated, we commit ourselves to a n tion of warrant which?whatever the detail of its best characterizat
is not itself open to externalist construal and relates to what it ta to be in position to claim that one knows or is otherwise mandated certain belief. What to say, then, about a formulation of the origi paradox in terms of this very notion: Premise (1) ~W~S// Premise (2) W[P=* ~SH] ~WP ?
As before 'P' is schematic for any proposition which we would cust arily regard as known perceptually, and SH is any scenario in wh we are subjectively undetectably perceptually disabled. But now t internalist character of the operator will sustain premise (1) agai externalist rebuttal; and premise (2) is unexceptionable as before. So the conclusion?assuming closure for Warrant?is that we are in no position to claim any of the knowledge, or whatever it is that mandates belief, that we normally regard as the product of our perceptual fac ulties. This is, essentially, a variant on the second-order skepticism touched on earlier. It is hardly less at odds with our epistemic self conception, or easier to tolerate, than the conclusion of the simple paradox. But it emerges, ironically, out of the very resources required to enable externalist?reliability-and safety-based?conceptions of warrant to address the latter in the intended manner.
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